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Abstract 
This paper provides a unified semantic and discourse pragmatic analysis of the German parti-
cle nämlich, traditionally described as having a specificational and an explanative reading. 
Our claim is that nämlich is a discourse marker which signals that the expression it is attached 
to is a short (elliptic) answer to a salient implicit question about the previous utterance. We 
show how both the explanative and the specificational reading can be derived from this more 
general semantic contribution. In addition we discuss some cross linguistic consequences of 
our analysis. 
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1. Introduction
The most striking puzzle about German particle nämlich (roughly: ‘namely’) is this: depend-
ing on its syntactic environment, nämlich can either function as a specificational marker, as in 
(1a), or as a marker of explanation, as in (1b.). 
(1) a.  Peter hat Max mit   einer  Frau    gesehen.  Nämlich   mit   deiner Schwester.  
Peter has Max with  a    woman  seen     namely    with  your   sister  
‘Peter saw Max with a woman, namely with your sister’  
b. Peter  ist  einkaufen  gegangen.  Er  hatte nämlich  keine Butter  mehr.
Peter  is   shopping   gone      he  had  namely   no   butter  more
‘Peter went shopping, since he had no more butter.’
While these readings may seem unrelated, we argue that a unified lexical entry for nämlich 
can be given: nämlich marks that the expression it attaches to is a short answer to an implicit 
question about the previous utterance. This paper is an implementation of this idea, there are 
some independent, interesting consequences though: the first one concerns specificational 
particles, the second more generally the presuppositional properties of discourse particles. 
1.1. Specificational particles 
There is a whole class of what we wish to call specificational particles, which have hardly 
been studied, and to which the analysis of nämlich should extend. Intuitively, specificational 
particles mark that some expression is used to specify some previously underspecified dis-
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course referent as in (2). We will show, however, that a more indirect analysis involving ques-
tions under discussion is necessary.  
(2)  John just met a famous actress, namely Julia Roberts.  
Specificational particles can be found in many languages such as a imenno in Russian, 
éspedig in Hungarian, érqiê in Chinese, ovvero in Italian, namelijk in Dutch or nämlich and 
und zwar in German, but there are also languages which do not lexicalize or grammaticalize 
this function but rather use more complex expressions like French c'est a dire (‘this is to say’) 
or Romanian mai precis (‘more precisely’). 
The interpretation of  (2) is similar to a specificational sentences, as in (3a) , or pseudo-cleft 
constructions, as in (3b), which are much better studied, cf. den Dikken (2005), Romero 
(2005), Heller (2005), Gerbl (2009) etc.. Yet, as opposed to specificational particles, clefts 
and specificational sentences come with existential presuppositions.  
(3)  a. The actress John just met is Julia Roberts.  
  b.  Who John just met is Julia Roberts.  
Specificational particles are also similar to apposition markers like that is, in other words or 
in short (Blakemore 1996), as in (4). In fact, omitting specificational particles would often 
yield the same interpretational effect as the resulting apposition, as shown in (5). 
(4)  The interpretation depends on pragmatic, in other words non linguistic, factors.  
(5)   a. My best friend, namely John, went to a party last night.    
   b.  My best friend, John, went to a party last night. 
Again, there are differences between apposition markers and specificational particles. One is 
that specificational markers do not attach to names (6a), whereas appositions with or without 
markers often do as in (6b). Moreover, some specificational markers can specify unarticulated 
constituents, as in (7). It is unclear, whether one would like to analyse (7) as an apposition if 
we replace und zwar with an intonational break. 
(6) a. * John, namely my best friend, went to a party last night.     
   b.   John, (scilicet) my best friend, went to a party last night.  
(7)  Peter hat  John  verprügelt. Und zwar  mit   einem  Besen.  
Peter  has  John  beaten     namely    with  a     broom   
‘Peter has beaten up John, namely with a broom.’  
Given that specificational particles seem to constitute a hitherto unanalysed functional cate-
gory that appears in many languages, our paper is not only meant to deliver an idiosyncratic 
analysis of a particular German particle but also to provide a general framework for the explo-
ration of specificational particles in other languages. 
1.2. Discourse particles 
The semantic contribution of discourse particles goes beyond standard truth conditional mean-
ing. It concerns expressive meaning (Kratzer, 1999), presuppositions and context marking 
(Zeevat, 2002, 2003) or conventional implicatures (Potts, 2005), all also known as projective 
meaning. Discourse particles often encode information about the context in which a particular 
utterance or expression must be interpreted or information about epistemic or emotional states 
of the speaker with regard to some particular proposition. In a narrower sense, the term dis-
course particle only refers to those particles that relate an utterance to the discourse context. 
Often, the meaning of discourse particles can be spelled out as a presupposition, but not all 
discourse particles allow the accommodation of their presuppositions: some (context markers 
in the sense of Zeevat 2003) cannot be accommodated while others, such as only in the analy-
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sis of Beaver and Clark (2008), can. Specificational particles come in both classes: nämlich 
mainly differs from und zwar in the non-availability of accommodation for its presupposition. 
Thereby the analysis of specificational particles contributes to a deeper understanding the 
presuppositional properties of discourse particles in general. 
1.3. The structure of this paper 
In section 2, we present the main puzzle about nämlich. In section 3, we present two existing 
approaches to this puzzle. We show that the existing approaches have significant shortcom-
ings and are in need of revision. In section 4, we provide additional data which allow the ex-
tension of our former analysis (Onea and Volodina 2009) which is formally implemented in 
section 5. Finally, section 6 discusses additional perspectives for further research. 
2. The Problem 
The German particle nämlich appears to have two clearly distinct readings that correlate with 
the syntactic environment in which this particle appears. This is captured in the generalization 
in (8). 
(8) Generalization:  
  If nämlich appears within a matrix clause, it has an explanative function, otherwise a 
specificational function. 
As shown in (9), nämlich can appear in any position within a matrix clause. 
(9)  Peter  ist glücklich. Maria (nämlich)  hat (nämlich) John (nämlich)  verlassen.  
Peter  is  happy      Mary  namely    has namely   John  namely   left  
‘Peter is happy, because Mary left John.’  
By within a matrix clause, in (8), we mean: between Spec CP of a non-elliptical matrix clause 
and the base generated (clause final) position of its finite verb. This is important because ex-
planative nämlich may thereby surface in a clause final position but not in a clause initial po-
sition. A clause final position may occur if no verbal element is surfacing in situ as in (10a) 
but not in (10b). (We share the standard assumption that in German matrix clauses finite verbs 
are moved to C as originally argued in Den Besten 1989, see e.g. Zwart 2001, Fanselow 2003, 
Müller 2003, Nilsen 2003 for additional discussion). Surprisingly, but widely irrelevant to this 
paper, nämlich can surface between the first constituent of a matrix clause and the finite verb 
as in (10c), having an explanative reading (see Breindl 2008, Onea & Volodina 2009, Karag-
josova this issue for discussion). 
(10)  a.  Peter liebt  Maria (nämlich) liebt  (*nämlich)  
    Peter loves Mary  namely   loves namely  
    ‘Because Peter loves Mary.’  
   b. Peter ruft   Maria (nämlich) an-ruft  (*nämlich)  
   Peter calls  Mary  namely   up-call  namely  
    ‘Because Peter calls Mary.’  
   c.  Peter  nämlich ruft   Maria  an. 
    Peter  namely  calls  Mary  up  
   ‘Because Peter calls Mary.’  
In any other case nämlich does not trigger an explanative reading. In (11) we give a whole 
range of cases in which non-explanative nämlich can be used: as an elliptic appositive clause 
as in (11a), as a disintegrated structure similar to right dislocation as in (11b), see Averint-
seva-Klisch (2009) and Onea & Volodina (2009) for discussion, introducing a subordinated 
clause, as in (11c), or even within the clause boundaries of subordinated clauses as in (11d).  
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(11)  a.  Eine  sehr  kluge  Frau,   nämlich  Maria,  hat  uns  angerufen. 
    A    very  clever  woman  namely  Mary   has  us  called  
    ‘A very clever woman, namely Mary, has called.’  
   b.  Eine  sehr kluge  Frau    hat uns  angerufen.  Nämlich  Maria.  
   A    very clever woman  has us   called     namely   Mary  
    ‘A very clever woman, namely Mary, has called.’  
   c.  Peter hat  etwas     Dummes gesagt.  Nämlich, dass der Direktor  verrückt  ist.  
    Peter has  something  stupid    said    namely   that  the  director   crazy    is  
    ‘Peter said something stupid, i.e. that the director is crazy.’  
   d. Maria  hat Peter etwas    Dummes  gesagt.  Dass  sie  ihn  nämlich  nicht   liebt. 
    Mary  has Peter something stupid    said    that  she  him namely   not    loves  
   ‘Mary said something stupid to Peter. Namely, that she doesn’t love him.’ 
The task of the rest of this paper will be to derive (8) from a single lexical meaning of näm-
lich. We will adopt the following strategy: first, we discuss some existing approaches, then, 
we develop three crucial properties of nämlich that in our view shed light on its core meaning 
components, and, finally, we formalize those insights.  
3. Former approaches 
The simplest way to look at the puzzle is denying that there is one, i.e. nämlich could be 
polysemous. Still, in the literature this has never been claimed, and, indeed, it seems that if a 
unified semantic account for nämlich can be given that has the potential to extend to other 
specificational particles as well such an account is superior to any polysemy account. We 
note, in passing, that a fully predictive polysemy account might not be easy to give either: it is 
at least not trivial why the explanative nämlich1 would be ruled out in non-root sentences, 
whereas specificational nämlich2 would be ruled out in root sentences.  
There are two types of non-polysemy approaches previously proposed in the literature:  there 
have been attempts to explain the specificational readings in terms of speech act level causal-
ity and alternatively to derive the explanative interpretation in term of specifying the answer 
to some implicit why-question. We now turn to these approaches in more detail. 
3.1.  Nämlich as a causal connective 
Granito (1984) and Pasch (2008, 2009) argue that nämlich is a causal connective and derive 
the specificational reading from the causal meaning. They argue that the true nature of näm-
lich is revealed in non-elliptical contexts, as in (12): hence, nämlich marks a causal relation 
between the eventuality of the sentence nämlich occurs in and the eventuality of the previous 
utterance. However, the causal relation does not apply at the propositional level but rather at 
the speech act level, hence the correct representation of (12) is (12b) and not (12a), in other 
words: the caused eventuality is the speech act itself. Note that even if in (12) there may be a 
real causal relation between the two propositions, since Mary's being pretty may indeed cause 
Peters love, in the theory of Granito (1984) this is at best a contingent issue. What nämlich 
marks is that the speaker provides the reason for the fact that he uttered asserted that Peter 
loves Mary. 
(12)  Peter liebt  Maria.  Sie ist nämlich  schön.  
Peter loves Mary  she is namely   pretty 
‘Peter loves Mary, because she is pretty.’  
a. CAUSE(loves' (P, M), pretty' (M))     
b. CAUSE(SAY(loves' (P, M)),pretty' (M))  
The specificational use of nämlich is treated as a special case of speech act level causality. By 
specifying a discourse referent of the previous sentence the speaker (in some way) explains 
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the fact that he made the previous utterance. Hence, in (13) the speaker specifies who Peter 
loves, and by this he provides an explanation of his previous, less informative utterance that 
Peter loves some woman. 
(13)   Peter liebt  eine  Frau.  Nämlich  Maria.  
Peter loves a   woman  namely   Mary  
‘Peter loves a woman. Namely Mary.’  
Specifying a discourse referent is not a form of explanation, however, or at least not gener-
ally. But even if it was, false predictions are made, e.g., that (14) is acceptable, since specify-
ing the place in which an event occurs would be just as good an explanation as specifying the 
participants of the event. In fact, even if one would specify the exact time and whatever 
amount of details he could think of in addition to the location thereby showing a maximum 
level of competence about the described event, the example would not get any better.  
(14)   # Peter küsst  Maria. Nämlich  im    Schlafzimmer.  
  Peter kisses  Mary  namely   in the  bedroom 
  Intended reading: ‘Peter kisses Mary, namely in the bedroom.’  
3.2.  Specificational nämlich 
In Onea & Volodina (2009) we have argued that the explanative reading of nämlich can be 
derived from its specificational reading. We assumed that nämlich marks that the expression it 
is attached to is a short answer to some implicit question about the previous utterance. An 
utterance containing some underspecified discourse referent (some discourse referent which 
could be assigned different individuals in some model) often gives rise to a justified question 
about which individual the speaker actually refers to: for (15a) the question arises Who did 
Peter see? or Which woman did Peter see?, as given in (15c).2  Now, nämlich marks that 
Mary is the answer to such a specificational question. Hence, Mary needs to be interpreted 
with respect to a particular question and the semantic contribution of nämlich is to represent 
that implicit question in the discourse. In Onea & Volodina (2009), this has been modelled in 
terms of a presupposition, but we will see later that this is not entirely appropriate. 
(15)   a. Peter hat eine Frau    gesehen.  
    Peter has  a   woman  seen  
    ‘Peter saw a woman...’   
   b. Nämlich  Maria.  
    namely   Mary  
     ‘...namely Mary.'     
   c.  Implicit question:   x. saw'(P, x) & woman'(x)   
   d.  Interpretation:   x.[saw'(P, x) & woman'(x)] (M) 
Turning to explanative nämlich, the crucial observation is that the semantic type of the ex-
pression attached to nämlich determines the type of the implicit wh-question. If nämlich is 
attached to a whole sentence, the sentence will be interpreted as a short answer to a question, 
which admits type t answers. The explanative reading arises because the typical question that 
admits type t short answers is a why-question as shown in (16c), which, hence, yields the cor-
rect interpretation in (16d). (The formal representations are very simplified).  
(16)  a. Peter hat wohl   einen  Polizisten  gesehen.  
    Peter has maybe  a     policeman  seen  
   ‘Peter probably saw a policeman...'   
                                                 
2
 These questions happen to be linguistically well-formed questions, however, this is not necessary. Implicit 
questions nämlich answers may be hard to express in natural language. 
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   b.  Er hat nämlich  die  Geschwindigkeit  reduziert.  
    he has namely  the  speed         reduced  
    ‘Since he reduced the speed.'     
   c. Question: p EXPL(p, (∃x)(policeman'(x) & saw'(P,x))   
   d.  Interpretation: EXPL(reduced'(P,ιx.speed'(x)), (∃x)(policeman'(x) & saw'(P,x))) 
The lexical entry that we provided for nämlich in Onea & Volodina (2009) is given in (17). 
Note that α corresponds to the previous sentence and Ψ is the expression which is immedi-
ately attached to nämlich. Further, the entailment of the main event of the previous utterance 
is meant to model the requirement that   Θ should be a question about α3. Note that we take 
the expression nämlich is attached to not to be elliptic in this old version of our approach, 
instead it is a term answer to a question represented as an incomplete proposition which, on its 
turn, takes this term directly as an argument. In section 5.2 we present an ellipsis based analy-
sis, but not much seems to hinge on this aspect.    
(17)  [[ nämlich]] = Ψ.α.∃Θ.Type(Θ) = <Type(Ψ), t> and Θ(Ψ) entails the main event of α.  
A salience hierarchy rules out the possibility that unwanted questions that would allow a type 
t answer interfere with the explanative interpretation. The hierarchy is such that a) questions 
that are satisfied by the discourse are high in this hierarchy, and b) per default why-questions 
will be on top of the hierarchy. This yields a defeasible explanative interpretation for nämlich 
combined with a type t expression.  
We consider that this is, indeed, the correct way to go, but as it stands, the analysis is incom-
plete (see also Karagjosova this issue for a critical review). For one thing, it remains mysteri-
ous why examples like (18) cannot have an explanative reading. Note that the only thing that 
counts, according to (17), is the semantic type of the expression nämlich is attached to, and in 
(18) this is quite clearly t.  
(18)  Peter  hat  ein  Problem.  Nämlich: die Arbeiter  wollen  Geld.  
Peter  has  a   problem  namely   the workers  want   money  
‘Peter has a problem, i.e. the workers want to be paid.’  
Secondly, the analysis is not restrictive enough in non-explanative cases. In such cases, näm-
lich and und zwar seem to have a very similar but not identical meaning, however, the analy-
sis cannot be used to distinguish them.  First, there are examples, like (19), in which the dis-
course referent specified by Maria is in principle uniquely identifiable albeit unknown to the 
hearer: in such a case specificational nämlich can be used, but not und zwar. 
(19)  Peter hat die beste Freundin von  John geküsst, nämlich / ??und zwar  Maria.  
Peter has the best  girlfriend  of   John kissed   namely /  namely    Mary  
‘Peter kissed Mary, the best friend of John.’  
Second, there are examples in which und zwar cannot be replaced by nämlich: e.g., the case 
of unarticulated constituents such as time, place, degree etc., see (14) (repeated here for con-
venience as (20)). 
(20) Peter küsst   Maria. Und zwar /??Nämlich im     Schlafzimmer.  
Peter kisses  Mary  namely    namely   in the  bedroom 
‘Peter kisses Mary, namely in the bedroom.’ 
Third, there are examples involving incomplete specification, i.e., in which a discourse refer-
ent is only partially specified, as in (21): the range of possible individuals that verify the dis-
course referent introduced by eine Frau (‘a woman’) is reduced to a smaller set which also 
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 Daniel Hole (p.c.) and the editors of this volume have pointed out to us, is that the entailment relation in (17) 
may not suffice to ensure that we have a question about the previous utterance.  
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satisfies the condition of being a girlfriend of the speaker, but not to a singleton as in a typical 
nämlich example. 
(21)  … eine  Frau,   und zwar / ??nämlich eine  Freundin  von  mir … 
   a    woman  namely     namely   a    girlfriend  of   mine  
   ‘… a woman, namely a girlfriend of mine…’  
Moreover, in particular dialogue situations, in which it is expected that the speaker has some 
problem or question (e.g. at a physician, psychologist or lawyer), one may start a dialogue by 
using und zwar to express that he is now ‘getting down to the task’, as in (22), but not with 
nämlich. 
(22)  Und zwar / *Nämlich  ich  habe einen Sohn und ...  
namely    namely    I   have a     son   and ...  
‘The problem is this: I have a son and ...’  
If an analysis of nämlich is to be complete it should make correct predictions for such cases. 
Moreover, if the analysis is supposed to generalize to the whole class of specificational parti-
cles it should be able to explain such contrasts between nämlich and und zwar in terms of pa-
rametric variation with the same underlying semantic structure. For this reason, in the follow-
ing section we turn to a much more detailed analysis of the subtle contrasts, nämlich may be 
involved in. 
4.  Three puzzling aspects 
In this section we discuss three types of empirical puzzles, providing some deeper generaliza-
tions regarding the semantic import of nämlich. 
4.1. Nämlich and prominence in discourse 
Nämlich cannot be used to specify discourse referents that are not explicitly present in the 
previous utterance, as shown in (20). This is not accounted for by our previous analysis, since 
the question Where did Peter kiss Mary? can be constructed and In the bedroom is an accept-
able short answer. If, however, we introduce the place argument by an indefinite, the con-
tinuation with nämlich becomes felicitous.   
(23)  Peter hat  Maria an einem  bestimmten Ort  geküsst.  Nämlich im    Schlafzimmer.  
  Peter has  Mary  on a      particular   place kissed   namely   in the bedroom   
  ‘Peter kissed Mary in a particular place, namely in the bedroom.’   
One possible solution involves the distinction between context markers and presupposition 
triggers. Context markers are understood as a specific class of particles such as the English 
too, German doch etc. which apparently trigger presuppositions, but crucially, their ‘presup-
positions’ cannot be accommodated in the context, i.e. either the context supports these pre-
suppositions or the utterance gets infelicitous. (23) would be, then, felicitous because the 
question is explicitly triggered in the discourse by the presence of the indefinite, and (20) is 
infelicitous because the question cannot be accommodated. 
Further evidence for this diagnostic comes from the observation that nämlich is more likely to 
occur in cases in which the discourse referent it specifies is particularly prominent in the dis-
course. (24a), under default intonation (main stress on Polizistin), only has one interpretation, 
namely that Mary is the police officer. However, if we make eine Freundin heavier, as in 
(24b), the interpretation that the friend is Mary is much more likely. 
(24) a.  Peter hat einer Freundin eine Polizistin vorgestellt.   Nämlich  Maria.  
    Peter has a       friend     an   officer    introduced   namely   Mary  
    ‘Peter introduced a police officer, namely Maria, to a friend.’  
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    b.  Peter hat einer bestimmten Freundin  eine Polizistin vorgestellt.  Nämlich  Maria.  
    Peter has a       specific     friend       an   officer   introduced   namely   Mary  
    ‘Peter introduced a police officer  to a particular friend, namely Maria .’  
Another way to increase the prominence is the addition of nur (‘only’), which insures that the 
discourse referent to be specified by nämlich has maximal discourse prominence, since it is 
the answer to the current discourse question (cf. Beaver & Clark 2008): in (25), ein junger 
Mann (‘a young man’) is just not prominent enough, as compared to einen großen Wunsch (‘a 
big wish’), to get specified by nämlich. Omitting nur (‘only’) makes the continuation (25b) 
acceptable. 
(25)  Ein  junger Mann  hat  nur   einen großen Wunsch.  
A     young  man   has  only one    big     wish  
‘A young man has only one big wish.’  
   a.  Nämlich seine große  Liebe zu finden.  
   Namely   his   great   love  to find  
   ‘Namely to find his great love’.   
   b.  ?? Nämlich  Peter.  
     namely   Peter   
    ‘Namely Peter’ 
While the contrast in (20) vs. (23) seems hard, the others are more subtle and not necessarily 
shared by all speakers. 
This translates to implicit questions as follows: any discourse referent that, in a particular dis-
course context, (at least from the point of view of the hearer) could correspond to different 
individuals in a model potentially gives rise to a wh-question of specification. If several speci-
fication questions are triggered by an utterance, they are ranked according to the discourse 
prominence of the triggering discourse referent, whereby unarticulated constituents are so low 
on prominence that they don’t trigger specification questions at all.  
An anonymous reviewer observes that several referents may be specified at the same time, as 
well, like in (26). This doesn’t mean, however, that several specificational questions are 
ranked highest at the same time, but rather, that a specificational double question may arise of 
the type: Who of my colleagues met who of pretty women?  
(26)  Einer meiner Kollegen traf eine schöne Frau,   nämlich Peter Maria. 
One   my       colleague met a     pretty   woman namely   Peter Mary  
‘A colleague of mine met a pretty woman, i.e. Peter (met) Mary.’ 
Another anonymous reviewer points out that not every indefinite would introduce a new 
specification question. For instance, (27a) doesn’t seem to trigger the question Which fish did 
Peter catch?. This patterns with the fact that (27b) seems a very odd continuation. However, 
(27a) could license a What kind of fish? question, and indeed, in an appropriate context, in 
which, the kind of fish, Peter has caught is relevant, (27c) seems an acceptable continuation.  
(27)  a.  Peter hat einen Fisch gefangen. 
   Peter has  a    fish    caught 
     ‘Peter caught a fish.’  
   b. # Nämlich den großen auf dem Tisch. 
         Namely  the  big       on   the  table 
         ‘Namely the big one on the table’  
    c.  ?   Nämlich eine Forelle. 
        namely    a     trout  
      ‘Namely a trout.’ 
This shows that the discourse prominence of the antecedent indefinite as well as general 
world knowledge and contextual information play an important role in the triggering and or-
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dering of specification questions. It seems, hence, that once we can model the prominence of 
discourse referents and the questions their referential underspecification gives rise to the ac-
ceptability of nämlich boils down to whether or not such a question is actually present in the 
discourse or not. If not, nämlich cannot be used to introduce such a question by means of ac-
commodation. Hence, nämlich is a typical context marker in the sense of Zeevat (2003) and 
not a classical presupposition trigger. 
4.2.  Nämlich and complete answers 
The question is, why, in (28), nämlich is way worse than und zwar.  
(28)  Vor     der Tür  steht   eine Frau.   Und zwar / *nämlich eine Freundin  von mir.  
In front the  door stands  a    woman namely        namely  a       girlfriend of   mine  
‘A woman stands in front of the door, namely a girlfriend of mine.’  
Replacing eine Freundin von mir (‘a girlfriend of mine’) with a proper name would make the 
example acceptable, hence nämlich would only be possible with referential expressions. This 
is not correct, though, for, in (29), wenig (‘little’) can hardly be considered a referential ex-
pression in the given context – many similar examples can be found with different types of 
quantifiers in the corpora.  
(29)  Er hatte vom   Französischen genausoviel Ahnung    wie vom  Deutschen.  
He had   from French       as much   knowledge  as   from  German  
Nämlich wenig.  
namely   little 
‘He new as much French as German, namely littlee.’ 
Even only considering referential expressions, interesting contrasts may arise. While the defi-
nite meine beste Freundin (‘my best girlfriend’) in (30a) only marginally improves the exam-
ple (28) for many speakers (at least as long as it is not granted that the hearer knows the best 
girlfriend of the speaker), deine beste Freundin (‘your best girlfriend’) makes the example 
perfectly acceptable, as in (30b). 
(30)  Vor    der  Tür  steht   eine Frau.  
In front  the  door  stands  a   woman  
 ‘A woman stands in front of the door.’   
   a.  ? nämlich meine beste Freundin.  
     namely  my   best   girlfriend  
     ‘Namely my best girlfriend.’   
   b.  nämlich deine  beste  Freundin.  
     namely   your  best   girlfriend  
   `Namely your best girlfriend.’ 
The generalization regarding referential expressions seems, hence: if, in a given discourse, the 
speaker initially wished to refer to a particular individual and but has chosen a non-referential 
expression and he assumes that the hearer doesn’t know who he refers to from chosen descrip-
tion, he may choose to specify the referent, but only if the specification he gives helps the 
hearer to identify the referent exhaustively. For (30) the hearer may or may not know the best 
girlfriend of the speaker, but in a neutral context he is definitely supposed to know his own 
best girlfriend. Of course, if the hearer has only partial knowledge of the referent, a less pre-
cise specification is also conceivable in an appropriate context. 
This is in line with an observation by an anonymous reviewer, who notes that nämlich cannot 
specify explicitly non-specific indefinites, whereas und zwar can, as shown in (31). Probably 
more needs to be said about the relation between specificity and specification, though, cf. von 
Heusinger & Chiriacescu (this issue) and Ionin (this issue) for additional discussion. A this 
point, we only observe that complete specification can, indeed, only be given if the speaker 
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has both the ability and the intention to do so: the use of an explicitly marked non-specific 
expression marks that either the ability or the intention of the speaker to become more explicit 
about the referent of the indefinite (if there is one at all) is not available.  
(31)  a.  # Ich suche    irgendeinen Drachen, nämlich einen roten. 
      I     search   any              dragon     namely   a       red 
     Intended reading: ‘I’m looking for a dragon, namely a red one’ 
   b.   Ich suche   irgendeinen Drachen, und zwar  einen roten. 
     I     search   any            dragon    namely    a        red 
       ‘I’m looking for a dragon, namely a red one’ 
These observations translate into our question-based approach as follows: we assumed that 
nämlich indicates that the expression it is attached to must be interpreted as an answer to an 
implicit question about the previous utterance; now we add that this answer must be complete 
regarding the communicative task at hand. 
It is hard to say, though, and an interesting research question, what it is for an answer to be 
complete. One way to circumvent the problem is to assume that after the nämlich-expression 
has been processed, the question that it answers must be eliminated from the stack of open 
questions in the sense of Roberts (1996). Hence, nämlich conventionally signals that the 
speaker wants the question he answers to disappear from the QUD-stack. Whenever this is not 
possible, nämlich cannot be used. And, since there is a certain amount of contextual flexibility 
regarding the removability of questions from the QUD-stack, the judgements regarding ex-
amples like (30) are expected to be gradual and to vary greatly from speaker to speaker. 
As an anonymous reviewer pointed out, one can think of this from a quite different perspec-
tive as well. One could say that the specification takes up an entity that is available for pro-
nominal reference.4 From this, if follows that the entity cannot be fully specified yet in the 
CG, and that the host of nämlich must offer a proper specification.  
There are two obvious problems with this alternative approach: first, how does this relate to 
explanative instances of nämlich? And, second, how is proper specification to be understood, 
so as to still permit the formal modelling of the contrast between the level of specification 
required by nämlich and the one required by und zwar. For the first problem, one can think of 
some kind of bridging mechanism between an event to be specified and its explanation, which 
could, actually be hard wired into the semantics of nämlich in some sense, and for the second 
problem, some distinction regarding the number of possible verifying individuals in the model 
(cases in terms of Dynamic Semantics) or the pragmatic usefulness of specification must be 
introduced. Obviously, however, questions under discussion would be perfectly suitable to 
model these distinctions: for an explanation is an answer to a how-come question, and com-
pleteness of an answer is an elegant measure of its pragmatic use. So, in a way, the two per-
spectives boil down by and large to the same. Since a question-based discourse model might 
ultimately be needed anyway, our way of thinking about a more direct connection between 
nämlich and questions seems more parsimonious.  
Finally, let us consider a surprising, but correct, prediction of the idea that completeness of 
answers correlates with removal from the QUD-stack: If nämlich marks that the implicit ques-
tion it answers must be removed from the QUD-stack, the speaker should assume that the 
answer to that question is definitive and there is nothing else to add. Hence, by using nämlich 
the speaker gives information he takes not to be further under discussion, i.e. uncontroversial. 
Indeed, it has been observed for a long time in the descriptive literature that nämlich is similar 
to the German bekanntlich (`scilicet') in that it is used to express information that is assumed 
                                                 
4
 See, Kaiser (this issue) and Zeevat (this issue) for discussion of pronominal reference and discourse in this 
volume. 
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to be known to both the speaker and the hearer (cf. for detailed critical discussion Frohning 
2007, similar results have been discussed in Gyuris 2009 regarding the Hungarian particle 
ugye). Clearly, the information marked by nämlich is not hearer-old. This led scholars to as-
sume some semantically coded uncontroversiality of the specification, but in our view, this 
effect comes from the fact, that the question it answers disappears from the stack of open 
questions. 
4.3.  Subordinate clauses vs. matrix clauses 
In our prior approach, we have argued that the explanative reading of nämlich can be derived 
from the fact that nämlich attaches to a full clause, i.e. to some semantic entity of type t. Un-
fortunately, we have shown above that nämlich cannot always have an explanative reading if 
it appears attached to a type-t semantic entity. Hence, the question is: why don't (32a) and 
(32b) exhibit an explanative reading, whereas (32c) does. 
(32)  a.   John hat etwas     Blödes gesagt: Nämlich dass  Maria  klug   ist.  
     John has something  stupid  said    namely  that  Mary  clever  is  
     ‘John said something stupid, namely that Mary is clever.’  
c.   John hat etwas     Blödes gesagt:  Nämlich: Maria  ist klug.  
 John has something stupid  said    namely   Mary  is  clever  
 ‘John said something stupid, namely that Mary is clever.’  
d.   John ist glücklich.  Maria ist nämlich  klug.  
John  is happy    Mary  is  namely  clever  
‘John is happy because mary is clever.’  
As for (32a), the answer seem easy to find: nämlich marks that the expression it is attached to 
is a short answer to a question and, in (32a), the embedded clause is simply no good answer to 
a why-question for syntactic reasons (that may or may not have a semantic reflex). As op-
posed to this, the nämlich-clause in (32c) is a good answer to a why-question. This nice ex-
planation is prima facie discredited, however, by the unfortunate fact that (32b)  patterns with 
(32c) in being a perfect answer to a why-question, yet, an explanative reading is not available 
for (32b). 
(32b) seems related to a much more prominent problem of German syntax also known as V2 
embedded clauses or the V to C movement problem in embedded clauses, (cf. among others 
Reis 1997, Gärtner 2000, Gärtner 2002 and Truckenbrodt 2006). It has been observed that 
verbs of saying, belief or knowledge allow both for verb-final (33a) and V2 complement 
clauses (33b), while other verbs, such as verbs of regret or fear as well as negated verbs, only 
accept the former kind of complement clauses, (33c) vs. (33d): 
(33)  a.  Peter glaubt/ weiß/  sagt,  dass  Maria klug   ist.  
    Peter believes knows  says  that  Mary  clever  is  
    ‘Peter believes knows says that Mary is clever.’   
b.  Peter glaubt/ weiß/   sagt,  Maria ist  klug.  
Peter believes knows  says  Mary  is  clever  
‘Peter believes knows says that Mary is clever.’  
c.   Peter befürchtet/  bedauert,  dass Maria klug   ist.  
Peter fears      regrets   that Mary  clever  is  
‘Peter fears regrets that Mary is clever.’  
d. *  Peter befürchtet/ bedauert,  Maria  ist klug.  
  Peter fears      regrets   Mary  is  clever 
  intended reading: ‘Peter fears regrets that Mary is clever.’ 
The same verbs which do not allow for a V2 complement clause also fail to allow for a V2 
clause in combination with nämlich to specify their complement, as shown in (34a-d). 
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(34)  a.    Peter glaubt   etwas,    nämlich dass  Maria  klug   ist.  
     Peter believes something namely  that  Mary  clever  is  
    ‘Peter believes something, namely that Mary is clever.’   
b.   Peter glaubt   etwas,     nämlich: Maria  ist klug.  
 Peter believes something  namely   Mary   is  clever  
 ‘Peter believes something namely that Mary is clever.’  
c.   Peter befürchtet  etwas,     nämlich dass  Maria  klug   ist.  
 Peter fears      something  namely  that  Mary  clever  is  
 ‘Peter fears that Mary is clever.’  
d. *  Peter befürchtet etwas,     nämlich  Maria   ist klug.  
  Peter fears      something  namely   Mary   is  happy  
   intended reading: ‘Peter fears something, namely that Mary is clever.’ 
We may conclude that our problematic example (32b) at least involves an embedded clause. If 
so, an explanative reading may not arise because why-questions cannot be answered with em-
bedded V2-clauses in general. This is a plausible assumption, since, in German, V2 embedded 
clauses, indeed, cannot answer overt why-questions even if they are headed by weil (‘be-
cause’): (35b) is at least marginal with normal intonation, cf. Reis (1997). 
(35) Warum/ Wieso     liebt     Peter   Maria?  
Why    how come   loves   Peter  Mary 
‘Why/ How come Peter loves Mary?’  
a.   Weil    sie  schön ist. 
because  she  pretty is  
‘Because she is pretty’ . 
b.  #  Weil    sie ist schön.  
  because  she is pretty  
  ‘Because she is pretty’  
Again, this seems a syntactic constraint. While being a mere stipulation at this point, this con-
straint at least solves our puzzle in an empirically sustainable way: nämlich with V2 embed-
ded clauses is not explanative, because V2-embedded clauses are not good answers to why-
questions. 
The solution is incomplete, though: nämlich can appear inside a V-final complement clause, 
without triggering an explanative reading but not inside a V2 complement clause. While 
(36a)5 means roughly the same as (34a), (36b) is completely different from (34b), in fact 
(36b) can only be interpreted in a specific context, in which the fact that Mary is clever some-
how explains the assumption that Peter believes something (e.g. we believe that Peter, the 
well known sceptic, now finally believes something, since Mary the ingenious philosopher 
managed to convince him.) 
(36)  a.   Peter glaubt   etwas,     dass    Maria nämlich klug  ist.  
     Peter believes something   that    Mary  namely  clever is  
     ‘Peter believes something, namely that Mary is clever.’   
b.   Peter glaubt   etwas,     Maria  ist nämlich klug.  
      Peter believes something  Mary  is  namely   clever  
      ‘Peter believes something, since Mary is clever’. 
It has been argued by many scholars including Gärtner (2002) or Truckenbrodt (2006) that V 
to C movement in German is connected to illocutionary force that ultimately triggers the addi-
tion of the proposition into the common ground or some belief system. If this is correct, then 
                                                 
5
 An anonymous reviewer pointed out that (36a) is not acceptable for all speakers.  Adding an intonational 
boundary between the clauses makes the sentence somewhat more acceptable, though, and in (38), structurally 
similar examples are given that illustrate the same point and are accepted by more speakers.  
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some interaction between the position of nämlich and the illocutionary force triggered by V to 
C movement must be assumed, since the position of nämlich seems irrelevant in this respect 
in V-final clauses but relevant in V to C clauses. We cannot spell out the details here, but we 
suggest the generalization in (37). Herein, by assertion we mean at least a commitment to the 
truth of the sentence, in some domain. 
(37)  A CP can only be asserted by the speaker if nämlich is c-commanded by spec CP, and 
cannot be asserted by the speaker, whenever nämlich c-commands the whole CP.  
Since an explanative context requires the commitment of the speaker to the truth of some 
proposition, it immediately follows, that (34b) cannot answer an explanative question. At the 
same time, (36b) clearly asserts a proposition, and hence may answer a why-question. The 
difference between (34b) and (36b), hence, boils down to different questions that the two 
nämlich-clauses answer: What does Peter believe? for (34b) and Why/How come Peter be-
lieves something? for (36b). 
(37) is also compatible with the fact that in V-final complement clauses nämlich can appear 
also inside the clause boundaries. This is so, because, as argued in Truckenbrodt (2006), V-
final clauses do not have the illocutionary potential to be asserted by the speaker. Therefore, 
the position of nämlich in these clauses is completely irrelevant. 
Finally, let us consider other types of embedded clauses. In German, V-final clauses can be 
embedded by means of a number of particles such as weil (‘because’), damit (‘so that’), wenn 
(‘if’ or ‘when’) etc. Nämlich can appear in any of the corresponding embedded clauses as 
shown in (38). 
(38)  a.  Maria wird  John  nur   unter bestimmten  Bedingungen   küssen.  
    Mary  will  John  only under certain     circumstances  kiss  
    Wenn er sie  nämlich bezahlt. 
    if    he her  namely  pays 
    ‘Mary will only kiss John under certain circumstances, i.e. if he pays her.’ 
   b. Maria hat  John  aus einem bestimmten Grund  geküsst.  
    Mary  has  John  out  one    particular   reason  kissed  
    Weil    er sie  nämlich bezahlt  hat.  
    because he her  namely  paid   has.  
    ‘Mary kissed John because of a particular reason, i.e. because he paid her.’  
   c.  Maria  hat John eingeladen, damit  er   ihr nämlich  kocht.  
    Mary  has John invited     so that  he  her namely  cooks  
    ‘Mary has invited John, so that he cooks for her.’  
In all of these cases nämlich signals that the clause it is attached to answers the particular kind 
of question determined by its syntactic structure. Often it is not so clear whether in a particu-
lar sentence we have an explanative or a specificational use of nämlich. This is perfectly in 
line with our analysis which assumes that nämlich is in fact always specificational and an ex-
planative interpretation can only be derived pragmatically in the context. In a sentence like 
(38c) the distinction is not clear because an aim of a human action is very often at the same 
time its explanation. For precisely this reason we don't see any clear contrast between (38c) 
and (39). 
(39)  Maria hat John mit   einem bestimmten Ziel eingeladen, damit   er ihr nämlich  kocht.  
Mary has  John  with a     particular  aim invited     so that he her namely  cooks  
‘Mary has invited John with a particular aim, namely so that he cooks for her.’  
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5.  Nämlich revisited 
In this section we sum up the above observations and develop a lexical entry for nämlich that 
is superior to the one presented in Onea & Volodina (2009). In the next step we present some 
of the merits of this lexical entry. 
5.1.  Background assumptions 
We assume that a discourse can be modelled in terms of a question hierarchy, as suggested in 
Roberts (1996). While the ultimate goal of a dialogue/discourse is to maximally increase the 
common ground, modelled as a context set (Stalnaker 1973, 1974), i.e. to achieve agreement 
on the ultimate question: What is the way things are?, or, From all possible worlds which one 
is ours?, for such a bold enterprise the interlocutors may choose better strategies than enu-
merating randomly ordered true propositions in an epic effort. One such strategy could be to 
narrow down the domain of investigation by means of sub-questions. For instance they may 
start by discussing the weather in Stuttgart or what people do in New York. Once such a sub-
question is settled, they may again, find sub-sub-questions, which allow for a more systematic 
treatment of their new task, for instance they may start with people who live in a particular 
district etc. Once a particular sub-question is settled, they can proceed to the sister-question, 
e.g. after we find out what people in Manhattan are doing, we may go on to Brooklyn etc. 
Such strategies can be modelled in terms of a QUD-stack. Once a strategy consisting of a 
number of sub-questions is chosen, all questions come on top of the QUD-stack. Obviously if 
a question is answered two things happen: we are able to clear it from the QUD-stack, hence 
the question immediately below it becoming the new QUD and we exclude a few possible 
worlds from the context set (assuming that we have a useful answer). 
Such a model has obvious merits beyond providing a conceptually solid discourse model, 
since it is congruent to some conventional aspects of natural language: in particular, natural 
language often explicitly marks what question or what kind of question a particular utterance 
answers, hence there seems to be an interface between discourse structure and information 
structure, cf. Roberts (1996), Büring (2003) or Beaver & Clark (2008). 
To make this idea more precise let us assume some definitions, which are nothing but a sim-
plified version of the discussion in Roberts (1996). As a background assumption, we assume 
that questions are sets of alternative answers. For explicitness, we assume that the alternative 
answers needn’t be exhaustive, as in Beaver & Clark (2008), however, all we say is in princi-
ple compatible with a partition semantics of questions in the sense of Groenendijk & Stokhof 
(1984). 
In (40) we define a question stack as a set of pairs of questions and time indices (numbers). 
The numbers are used for ordering reasons, and the definition makes sure that the same ques-
tion cannot appear with two different time indices in the stack. Nothing in the definition of the 
question stack makes sure that super questions and sub-questions are ordered properly. We 
have chosen this simplification, simply because for the semantics of nämlich this part of the 
QUD-stack problem is irrelevant, but of course, we are aware of the fact that a more complex 
model of discourse and QUD-stacks is needed. In (40a-c) three operations are defined on the 
simplified question stack. In (40b) and (40c) we define an operation that adds a question to a 
question stack and an operation that deletes a question from the question stack, while (40a) 
simply picks out the last element of the QUD-stack. 
(40)  Let A be a question stack iff  (∀a,t) (<a,t> ∈ A → a is a question & t is a time index  & 
(∀q,t1,t2)((<q,t1> ∈ A) → (t2≠t1 ∨ <q,t2>∉A))) 
   a. LAST(M) =def the unique q such that (∃t)(<q,t> ∈M & {<a,b>|<a,b>∈M & b≥t}=∅)      
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   b.  DELETE(M)=def M \ {<LAST(M),t>|t is a time index} 
c.  ADD(Q,M) =def  M ∪ {<Q,t>} where t is the actual time index 
Given these definitions, we can think of a context as a pair containing a common ground 
(CG), which is a set of possible worlds, which are compatible with the knowledge states of 
the speaker and hearer, and a QUD-stack. Each communicative move has the effect of creat-
ing a new context. Communicative moves operate on the CG and the QUD-stack. An asser-
tion, for instance, may be felicitous in a discourse, only if it is relevant to the last QUD, 
which, again, may be defined in terms of Roberts (1996) in more detail. 
5.2.  The meaning of nämlich 
In (41) we propose a lexical entry for nämlich. 
(41) [[ nämlich]] =  r.p.   
a. Felicity conditions:  
 (i)  (∀q)(q ∈ LAST(QUD) → q |=  p) 
 (ii) (∃X,Y)(X ≠Y & X∈ ALT(r) & Y∈ ALT(r) & X∈ LAST(QUD) &  
    Y∈ LAST(QUD)) 
b. Semantic contribution: 
  (i)  CGnew = r ∩ CGold 
   (ii)  QUDnew = DELETE(QUD)  
c. Syntactic constraint:  
 (i)  At least a part of the expression, denoting r must be elliptical. 
Nämlich, hence, combines with two propositions, as suggested by the structure in the example 
(42). p is the previous utterance and r is the proposition in which nämlich appears. 
(42)  Peter  liebt  eine  Frau.   Peter liebt  nämlich  Maria.  
Peter  loves a    woman  Peter  loves namely   Mary  
‘Peter loves a woman, namely Mary.’  
    [[ nämlich]] ([[Peter liebt Maria]]) ([[Peter liebt eine Frau]])  
Nämlich is has two felicity conditions. The first one, (41a-i), is that the current question is 
about the previous utterance. This makes sure that nämlich doesn’t answer any non-
specificational question. Technically, this is modelled, by requesting that every element of the 
last element of the QUD-stack (which is a set of possible answers) entails the previous utter-
ance p. Clearly, if all possible answers of a question entail a proposition, that question, is, in a 
sense, about that proposition. For instance, any answer to Which woman does Peter love? en-
tails Peter loves a woman. The second, felicity condition (41a-ii), says that the clause, näm-
lich combines with, must be an answer to the current question under discussion. This is tech-
nically achieved by assuming that the focus alternatives of r (ALT(r) sensu Rooth 1992) in-
clude at least two elements which are also elements of the current question, i.e. the last ele-
ment of the QUD-stack. One of these can, of course, be r.  
We note, in passing, that under a partition semantics account, an exhaustification operator 
EXH, like the one in (43a), needs to be added to (41a-ii), as shown in (43b). At the same time, 
due to the nature of the exhaustification operator and the specific way the partition semantics 
for questions works, (43b) is equivalent to (43c), as the reader can reconstruct for herself.  
(43)  a.  EXH(a, A) =def a & (∀b) (b∈A & b ≠a → ¬b) 
   b.  (∃X,Y)(X ≠Y & X∈ ALT(r) & Y∈ ALT(r) & EXH(X,ALT(r))∈ LAST(QUD) &  
    EXH(Y, ALT(r))∈ LAST(QUD)) 
   c. EXH(r,ALT(r)) ∈ LAST(QUD) 
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Finally, we mention, that there is a difference between felicity conditions and presuppositions 
in our terminology. Felicity conditions cannot be accommodated. This reflects the intuition 
described above that nämlich is a context marker and not a full-fledged presupposition trigger. 
The semantic contribution of a nämlich-utterance amounts to a simple assertion, (41b-i), and 
to the exclusion of the last question under discussion from the question under discussion 
stack, as required in (41b-ii). 
We assume that there is a general discourse rule that makes sure that questions are removed 
from the QUD-stack as soon as they are answered or acknowledged to be unanswerable in a 
given discourse situation. Our stipulation that nämlich triggers the exclusion of the last ques-
tion from the stack is unrelated, however, since excluding a question from the stack via a dis-
course rule involves a former negotiation: the speaker and the hearer must both accept the 
answer or the conclusion that no answer to the question can be given. By virtue of (41b-ii), 
however, no negotiation is necessary. The speaker hereby signals, that the information marked 
by nämlich answers the current question to the maximal possible extent, and he expects no 
further reaction from the hearer in this regard, in fact: the question, the hearer ought to ad-
dress is the previous question in the stack, namely the one, that the previous utterance ad-
dressed. This way, the information marked by nämlich is not negotiable. Intuitively, this 
amounts to saying that the speaker is specifying what he meant by his own previous utterance, 
and this is – indeed – in his sole competence. If the hearer has any problem accepting that 
information he should rather comment on the previous utterance that, in a way, includes the 
information specified by nämlich already, at least as far as the speakers original communica-
tive intentions are concerned. (Note, of course, that this rule can be broken for achieving spe-
cial rhetorical effects, but we will ignore this in this paper.) 
An additional syntactic stipulation is that at least some part of the background of r must be 
elided and recoverable from the context. This makes sure that if in (42) Peter liebt were 
overtly present the whole proposition that Peter loves Mary could only be a part of the first 
proposition (r) nämlich combines with. In other words, nämlich combines with a short (ellip-
tical) answer to the current question. 
The reconstruction of the ellipsis is an issue independent of our concerns in this paper. Note 
that we treat ellipsis as a purely technical issue here, we could just as well define a non-
elliptical version of the lexical entry, in which the expression nämlich combines with is some 
term that combines directly with a question modelled as an incomplete proposition. There is a 
whole discussion about this issue, cf. recently Merchant (2004, 2008) vs. Ginzburg & Sag 
(2000) and Jacobson (2008). We remain neutral with regard to this issue. In our former ap-
proach, in Onea & Volodina (2009), we have argued for a non-elliptical analysis of short an-
swers. The above shows that nämlich is not only compatible with elliptical answers, but, in 
fact, ellipsis is quite convenient, since it allows us to rule out explanative interpretations for 
embedded complement clauses without further stipulations.  
It is important to note a very clear prediction of our analysis: since nämlich always combines 
with an elliptical clause according to our theory, in cases, in which there is an overt clause 
attached to nämlich, as in (1b), any overtly observable information structure of the corre-
sponding clause will be irrelevant for the interpretation of nämlich. The reason is that due to 
its elliptic nature, the overt material nämlich attaches to is already a focus, and any embedded 
information structure inside this overt material is irrelevant for the matrix focus background 
structure of the whole nämlich-sentence. 
One exception is discussed in Onea & Volodina (2009), namely the case of (10c), in which 
nämlich appears in an unexpected syntactic position (the postinitial position) and triggers a 
topic shift effect, originally observed in Breindl (2008). In our 2009 paper we have argued, 
that in this particular construction, the topical element is also part of the normally elided 
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background material (the reason for being overt being a contrastive feature), hence, being 
relevant for the global final information structure of the sentence. We do not go into details 
here, cf. also Karagjosova (this issue) for discussion of that argument and some empirical 
problems it faces. We concede that our 2009 argument regarding examples like (10c) needs 
refinement. We wish to address this problem in a distinct paper, however, since the analysis 
of postinitial topic shift is not only available with and, hence, not directly related to the se-
mantics of nämlich.  
5.3.  Nämlich in pragmatic interpretation 
Let us, at this point, consider some applications of the analysis given above and demonstrate 
how the different readings of nämlich can arise in the process of pragmatic interpretation 
starting out from the minimal semantic contribution given in (41). First we discuss an exam-
ple for the specificational reading and in the next step we discuss how the explanative reading 
can be derived, where applicable. We start with the example (44), in which nämlich clearly 
has a specificational reading. 
(44)  Peter   hat  ein  Buch   gelesen, nämlich   Harry Potter I.  
Peter  has  a   book   read    namely   Harry Potter  I  
‘Peter has read a book, namely Harry Potter I.’  
In the first step, we observe that when the speaker introduces the proposition that Peter has 
read a book into the common ground a number of possibilities are still open: Peter might have 
read “The Buddenbrooks” or “War and Peace” or “Harry Potter I” or some other book. Since 
all of these possibilities are open, if the discourse referent introduced by ein Buch is promi-
nent enough in the discourse, e.g. because it is the answer to a former question under discus-
sion or because the speaker intends to refer to a specific book, this gives rise to a specifica-
tional question, namely Which book did Peter read?  
If such a question does not arise in the discourse, or, if the speaker cannot assume that this 
question is present in the discourse, he may not use nämlich to answer it. Only if this question 
is the current question under discussion, nämlich may be used. 
Let us, now, assume that the correct syntactic representation of (44) is in (45). 
(45)  Peter hat ein  Buch gelesen, Peter hat nämlich Harry Potter I  gelesen.  
Peter has a    book read    Peter has namely  Harry Potter I  read  
‘Peter has read a book, namely Harry Potter I.’  
It is easy to see that the felicity conditions given in (41) are fulfilled, since any alternative 
propositional answer to Which book did Peter read? entails that Peter read a book, and, in 
addition, Peter read Harry Potter I is an answer to Which book did Peter read? The proposi-
tion nämlich combines with is also elliptical, as required in (41c). Once Peter read Harry Pot-
ter I is added to the common ground, indeed, the question under discussion can be removed 
from the QUD-stack, since it is completely answered. 
Note that in an absurd situation in which the current question were What did John read? the 
felicity conditions would not be satisfied, since not every alternative propositional answer to 
this question entails that Peter read some book, Peter also could have read a newspaper. In 
addition, if we assume that the elided material is not Peter hat ... gelesen, the felicity condi-
tions will, again, be violated, since this way, the proposition will be no answer to the current 
question, and, moreover, the elided material will not be recoverable from the context. Hence, 
given our lexical entry for nämlich, we get the correct interpretation and rule out incorrect 
interpretations. 
Let us consider an explanative example such as (46). 
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(46)   Peter hat ein  Buch gelesen. Er war  nämlich in der  Bibliothek.  
Peter has a    book read    he was  namely  in the  library  
‘Peter read a book, since he was in the library.’  
In a typical situation in which this kind of example could occur, the speaker realizes after ut-
tering that Peter has read a book that his utterance may not seem fully justified to the hearer 
for whatever reasons. Hence, a why- or rather how come- type of question arises. Such a ques-
tion is represented as a set of alternatives of the type {I may truthfully utter that Peter has read 
a book, since I know that p | p is a proposition}. Of course, other questions could also arise, 
such as Why did Peter read a book? etc. crucially, however for such questions the continua-
tion in (46) would not be an appropriate answer, given our general world knowledge: people 
don’t read books because they are at the library, but rather they go to the library in order to 
read books. As soon as the correct question is established as the current question under dis-
cussion, the derivation will work out exactly as above and the inference we end up getting is: 
I may utter that Peter has read a book, since I know that he was in the library. With this in-
ference being added to the common ground, the question is removed from the QUD-stack and 
we can go on with the old discourse topic. Note that, again, we had to assume an elliptical 
structure. 
It should be clear that any kind of question that presupposes the first utterance can be the cur-
rent question, and hence, not only explanative readings are predicted. Karagjosova (this issue) 
observes that not any kind of question will do, for instance, one cannot use nämlich to mark 
the answer to a question like What happened aftewards? In Onea & Volodina (2009) a ques-
tion hierarchy based on salience in the context, has been proposed which make why- or how-
come-questions particularly salient, hence indirectly ruling out the kinds of questions. 
This problem doesn’t even arise, however, under the present approach. Nämlich guarantees 
that the question under discussion is about the previous utterance and must be immediately 
removed from the QUD-stack (hence insuring a return to the previous question). This, on the 
one hand, yields discourse subordination in terms of SDRT (Asher & Lascarides 2003), and 
thereby rules out typical narrative questions such as What happened afterwards?. On the other 
hand, it rules out discourse subordinating but at the same time topic changing questions such 
as elaborative questions. This is because elaboration introduces new, negotiable information. 
Since, however, nämlich, by virtue of the fact that the question it answers disappears instanta-
neously from the discourse representation doesn’t allow any negotiation for the pieces of in-
formation added elaboration is ruled out.  
Karagjosova (this issue) argues that ruling out elaboration is, in fact, a false prediction. In 
(47), she argues, we have a clear case of elaboration. At the same time, this example also 
shows, in her view, that nämlich interacts with overtly observable foci in its scope. As de-
picted above, we predict this to be impossible. For (47), she argues that the question Er hat 
ein Hemd befleckt with focus on ein Hemd befleckt answers the question, (47a). 
(47)   Fred hat  ein Kleidungsstück beschädigt. [Er]T hat nämlich [ein Hemd befleckt]F. 
Fred has  a   garment      damaged.   He  has  namely   a shirt    stained. 
‘Fred has damaged a piece of garment. He stained a shirt.’ 
  a.  What did Fred specifically do to damage a garment? 
We do not consider this example to be counterevidence for our theory, however. The con-
tinuation in (47) doesn’t answer What did Fred do?, even though the overtly available sen-
tence does. In our view, the superordinate question at the level of which nämlich is interpreted 
is something like How come you can truthfully assert that Fred damaged a garment? and the 
local information structure of the overt clause (which is only the non-elliptical part of the ac-
tual nämlich-clause) marks an embedded strategy of answering this superordinate question. If 
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this is correct, (47) is not an instance of elaboration, but a somewhat opaque case of explana-
tion, and, hence,  nämlich also does not interact with the local information structure. 
We acknowledge that in such cases our rigid distinction between elaboration and explanation 
might seem somewhat superfluous for practical purposes. However, we think that one 
shouldn’t generally allow elaboration as an interpretation option for nämlich inside matrix 
clauses for this would make predicting the correct reading of (36b), repeated here as (48), 
very hard or even impossible. The main problem with this example is that Mary being clever 
is just not a likely explanation for Peters believing something, but at the same time a very 
likely belief content. Still, (48) simply forces an explanative interpretation. The reader can 
reconstruct for herself, how our own theory predicts an explanative reading for (48). 
(48)   Peter glaubt   etwas,     Maria  ist nämlich   klug.  
    Peter believes something  Mary  is  namely    clever  
    ‘Peter believes something for/since Mary is clever.’ 
6.  Conclusion and further research 
In this paper we have solved an empirical puzzle about nämlich, i.e. that it has an explanative 
readings whenever it appears inside a matrix clause but looses this reading in any other case. 
The key argument is that nämlich always specifies the answer to an implicit question about 
the previous utterance. Hence, nämlich has a specificational meaning. The explanative read-
ing arises in the process of pragmatic interpretation if the implicit question that is answered by 
the clause nämlich is attached to is a why-/how come-question. 
What we would like to highlight in this concluding section is the question what we generally 
learn from this analysis and how it can be applied to other specificational particles. We will 
show that our analysis easily transposes to the German und zwar. 
Recall that there are two main differences between und zwar and nämlich. First, nämlich must 
give complete answers to the specificational question, while und zwar allows for incomplete 
answers, as shown in (28), repeated here for convenience as (49). The second difference is 
that und zwar can specify unarticulated constituents as shown in (7) repeated here as (50). 
(49)  Vor    der Tür   steht  eine Frau.   Und zwar / *nämlich eine Freundin von  mir.  
In front the  door stands a   woman  namely     namely    a   girlfriend  of   mine  
‘A woman stands in front of the door, namely a girlfriend of mine.’  
(50)  Peter hat John verprügelt. Und zwar  mit   einem  Besen.  
Peter has John beaten    namely    with  a     broom   
‘Peter has beaten up John, namely with a broom.’   
We can easily account for both of these differences by assuming that, as opposed to nämlich, 
the existence of a special kind of current question is not a felicity condition for und zwar but 
rather a presupposition. So, accommodation is possible. In addition we may remove the con-
straint that the the question und zwar answers must be deleted from the QUD-stack. The result 
is given in (51). 
(51) [[ und zwar]] =  r.p.   
a. Presupposition:  
 (i)  (∀q)(q ∈ LAST(QUD) → q |=  p) 
 (ii) (∃X,Y)(X ≠Y & X∈ ALT(r) & Y∈ ALT(r) & X∈ LAST(QUD) &  
   Y∈ LAST(QUD)) 
b. Semantic contribution: 
  (i)  CGnew = r ∩ CGold 
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c. Syntactic constraint:  
 (i)  At least a part of the expression, denoting r must be elliptical. 
 (ii)  und zwar must c-command its semantic argument 
This accounts for the third striking property of und zwar, as well, i.e. that it can be used to 
start a discourse. The explanation is this: the question What is the problem? / How can I help 
you? can be accommodated for und zwar and since the question is still open after the process-
ing of the und zwar-sentence/-phrase the whole discourse can elaborate on this question. 
Note, that the syntactic constraint in (51c-ii) also accounts for another, obviously even more 
important, difference between nämlich and und zwar, namely, that und zwar cannot have an 
explanative reading. This falls out directly from the generalization given in (37): since und 
zwar must c-command its semantic argument, it automatically blocks its illocutionary force 
that would be needed for an explanative interpretation. How this exactly relates to the above 
mentioned fact that und zwar can start very special kinds of dialogues, is still mysterious, 
however. We suspect that those cases involve extreme syntactic disintegration that leads to a 
bleached und zwar interpretation that ignores this constraint. 
The semantic difference between und zwar and nämlich, hence, boils down to the difference 
between a presupposition trigger and a context marker in the sense of Zeevat (2003). This 
result seems natural, since most discourse particles in the narrower sense specified in section 
1 are in fact context markers, i.e. they trigger presuppositions about the shared knowledge 
between interlocutors, about their communicative aims and generally about information states 
and information retrieval strategies, such as question hierarchies, but these presuppositions 
cannot be accommodated.  The theoretical question should be, hence, raised, whether there is 
a more general similar pattern that can be observed across languages with regard to specifica-
tional particles in both types of presuppositional expressions. Onea (2010) shows that an ex-
tension Hungarian éspedig and mégpedig is possible along the line of our analysis.  
We hope to have shown that the analysis of nämlich presented in this paper not only helps 
solve the empirical puzzle we started with in a straightforward and comprehensive manner but 
also opens the way for a wider analysis of so called specificational particles. We also hope 
that the analysis of further specificational particles will help in solving the remaining puzzles 
about nämlich in future research. 
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